The Failed Diesel Generator I predicted at Pilgrim

The Failed Diesel Generator I predicted-anticipated At Pilgrim...  

 

I predicted a failed DG and it showed up few months later. I believe the defect was available in Juno and this guy would have failed in it mission time if the accident would have been worst.
 

It is really so sloppy safety wise...   

Blizzard Timeline in 2015 with Pilgrim Nuclear Plant

This is what Entergy is supposed to do at Pilgrim. They are supposed to anticipate problems based on the heavy duty use with the Diesel Generators. 

(Jan 28) Additional Scrutiny at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant Set to Continue

Mike Mulligan February 11, 2015 at 10:47 am

This is what I got a problem with…everyone only showing the most prettified version of self. Not the most completely accurate version of events. The selective release of information that only creates the most handsome profile of self. The Brain Williams in the nuclear industry?

(2015) “During winter storm Juno, operators observed that water level indicators at the plant water intake were non-functional.”

Why didn’t the NRC admit this was missed by Entergy in storm Nemo? Why didn’t the NRC catch it in 2013? If you had a special inspection in 2013, you would have caught it then and preventing its re-occurrence in 2015?

What are you guys going to do if another blizzard knocks Pilgrim into another LOOP in 2015? I am predicting one diesel generator failure this time due to the accumulation to all the fast start-ups creating excessive stress on these machines. How many fast start-ups are these machines designed for considering all the LOOPs at this site and the integrated eccs testing ? 

Don’t even get me talking about the broken meteorological tower I caught in Nemo…it being unreliable for a long period of time before this. This impaired a possible evacuation. I got it on the Pilgrim docket.

I do admit the water level is kind of insignificant in the big picture…but not knowing the limitation of your indications in a big event is bad.

They handled this like little leaguers. They didn't conservatively call the machine as inop just like the SRVs. I bet you this leakage was going on for a lot longer time...all through the winter.    

August 11, 2015: PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000293/2015002

Description. On March 18, 2015, at 2:15 AM, operators entered TS 3.5.F, “Minimum Low Pressure Cooling and Diesel Generator Availability,” to perform pre-startup checks of the X-107B EDG in accordance with procedure 8.9.1, “Emergency Diesel Generator and Associated Emergency Bus Surveillance,” Revision 129. TS 3.5.F provides a 72 hour limiting condition for operation (LCO) that can be extended to 14 days provided that all low pressure core and containment cooling systems, and the SBO diesel generator are determined to be operable. When the engine was rolled over with air to verify that no fluid was present in any of the cylinders, engine coolant was instead observed to spray out of the open cylinder test cock on cylinder 9L. Entergy staff estimated that approximately six ounces of fluid was discharged. This issue was entered into the CAP as CR-2015-02109. Entergy staff determined that the X-107B EDG had been and remained operable because the volume of fluid that had been discharged would not have produced a hydraulic lock on cylinder 9L and therefore would not have prevented the engine from starting. Entergy staff exited TS 3.5.F at 2:30 AM.

The TS-required monthly surveillance test was satisfactorily completed on the X-107A EDG on April 2, 2015, approximately two weeks after the X-107B EDG 9L cylinder head coolant leakage event. While this did not eliminate the TS violation discussed above, it did demonstrate that, from a risk perspective, the X-107A EDG had been capable of performing its design safety function during that period.

Entergy staff stated that their EDGs were capable of operating with one cylinder removed from service; however, were unable to provide the inspectors with any design documents or engineering calculations showing that the EDGs would be capable of supplying design basis loads under such conditions.

NRC Blog: My Comment On Pilgrim, Storm Juno and SRVs

My comments here are a amazing body of work.

Additional Scrutiny at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant Set to Continue

Nuclear Power Plants Ready For Major Winter Storm

NRC Finalizes Violations for Arkansas Nuclear One

More proof below the staff is amazingly incompetent. The commonality of a lot of these things, they fake astonishing incompetence and never anticipated problems when it threatens plant operation, then once the operation threat disappears they admit the truth... 

Again, look at all the non related problems surrounding the degrading vacuum problem.

Licensee Event Report 2015-002-00, Main Steam Safety Relief Valves Determined to be Inoperable Following Evaluation

Licensee Event Report 2015-005-00, Degrading Condenser Vacuum Resulting in Manual Reactor Scram

Rearranging the deck chairs on the nuclear Titanic

by Jeff Kingston

Special To The Japan Times

Sep 19, 2015

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s recently released postmortem on the Fukushima nuclear accident of 2011 makes for grim reading and serves as a timely reminder of why the restart of the Sendai nuclear plant in Kyushu is a bad idea. 

When an atomic energy advocacy organization delivers multiple harsh assessments of Japan’s woeful nuclear safety culture and inadequate emergency countermeasures and disaster management protocols, it’s time to wonder how much has really changed in the past five years — and whether restarting any of the nation’s nuclear reactors is a good idea. 

In 2012, the government established a new nuclear safety watchdog agency called the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) and it now contends that Japan has the strictest nuclear safety regulations in the world. But is that true? And does it matter? 

David Lochbaum, co-author of last year’s “Fukushima: The Story of a Nuclear Disaster,” the best book on the meltdowns that I’ve read, likens recent reforms to “rearranging the deck chairs on the nuclear Titanic” He’s not buying Japan’s claim of having the world’s strictest guidelines. 

“I’d sooner buy the Brooklyn Bridge,” Lochbaum says. “What would Japan have said about its safety guidelines on March 10, 2011? Would they have conceded that their safety guidelines ranked 23rd worldwide, but that level of protection was good enough for the people of Japan? 

“It’s all valueless posturing. No regulator in any country would publicly confess to anything less than the best on the planet. 

Had the NRA existed pre-Fukushima, Lochbaum thinks the disaster would have shown that structure to be inadequate.

“The NRA would have been splintered and its roles relegated to various governmental agencies,” he says. 

At the time, however, responsibility and authority for nuclear safety was divided among various agencies, so the government moved to concentrate such powers under the NRA and calls that a solution. 

“Disasters are bad and require changes,” Lochbaum says. “That the changes fail to address the underlying problems gets lost.” 

However, Japan is not the only nation “rearranging the nuclear deck chairs” to conjure a simulacrum of enhanced safety, and Lochbaum points to an incident in 2008 in Pennsylvania as an example. 

“When contract security officers were discovered sleeping on the job at the Peach Bottom nuclear plant, its owner fired the contractor and brought the security officers in-house,” he says. “It was essentially the same group of individuals wearing different emblems on their uniforms. But somehow the different emblems ‘fixed’ the problem and all was well with the world.” 

A relevant story since most of the NRA’s employees used to work at the discredited Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, which was blamed for poor oversight and safety lapses due to regulatory capture and servile deference to the utilities. 

“It’s more convenient than truthful to blame Fukushima on regulatory capture,” Lochbaum says. “I am unaware of any reactor type operated by any company in any nation that would have survived the one-two punch that the earthquake and tsunami dealt that plant.” Yet, it is disconcerting to know that according to Lochbaum, “Fukushima’s design and operating procedures were not radically different than those deployed worldwide.” 

Both the IAEA report and Lochbaum emphasize the need for defense in depth, meaning multiple levels of safety infrastructure, equipment and redundancy to reduce the possibility of a nuclear accident. 

Defense in depth depends on manifold barriers that lessen risk, but Lochbaum points out all the barriers that failed at Fukushima: off-site power was lost, on-site power was lost, backup on-site power could not be deployed in time, the protective sea wall was insufficient, and more. 

“Had just one of these barriers worked, Fukushima would not have happened,” Lochbaum says. “There was simply not enough what-iffing going on” — what the IAEA describes as a “failure to challenge existing safety systems.” 

By not preparing for the worst and relying on probabilistic scenarios based on overly optimistic assumptions, the IAEA implies that Japan’s nuclear regulators and plant operators were derelict in their duties. There is a danger that the NRA, in touting its new safety regime, is yet again nurturing a myth of safety. 

“When our guesses are good, the ‘strictest regulations’ look real good,” Lochbaum says. “When our guesses are bad, it must be regulatory capture or centralized governance, or de-centralized governance, or whatever lame excuse wanders by.” 

The NRA will still rely extensively on plant operators reporting and self-inspections to ensure compliance with regulations. Given that all the utilities operating reactors admitted they faked their repair and maintenance data, why trust them now? 

Lochbaum also notes the huge discrepancies between safety assessments by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and plant operators. He likens safety goals to nuclear speed limits, but these are meaningless since the government’s radar gun and the utilities’ speedometers are way out of line. The closest match has a radar reading of a utility doing 110 miles per hour when it claimed it was following the 55 mile-per-hour speed limit. But at another nuclear plant at Watts Bar in Tennessee, when the “atomic speedometer showed 55 miles per hour, the NRC’s radar gun indicated a smokin’ fast 42,853 miles per hour!” 

He concludes that existing risk-assessment models “cannot be used for anything other than amusing storytelling and nonproductive time-wasting until their results have closer agreement. Differing by factors of 2 to 800 about risks doesn’t allow risk-informed decision-making. It supports risk-deformed decision-making.” 

And don’t bank on Japan’s reactor stress tests or other new measures such as taller sea walls, longer-duration batteries and other incremental upgrades. 

“Individually and collectively, (those things) hedge our guesses and make it less likely that a bad guess will trigger another nuclear disaster,” Lochbaum says. However, “As long as protective barriers are determined by guesswork without the ‘what if’ backups, nuclear disasters will continue to happen.” 

The IAEA says there is no room for complacency about nuclear safety, but it fails to call Japan out for a major flaw in its disaster emergency preparedness. It details the need for a proper emergency evacuation organization, training and drills, but under current rules this is the responsibility of local hosting towns, one that exceeds their limited capacity — especially now that the evacuation zones around nuclear plants have been expanded to 30 km. 

Simulations of evacuations under optimistic assumptions underscore that people living inside the evacuation zone will be exposed to significant radiation because transport networks will be jammed. And if we factor in a volcanic eruption depositing a thick layer of ash and a simultaneous tsunami wiping out coastal roads, the evacuation would be disastrous. 

The Titanic was also ill-prepared to evacuate its passengers because it failed to consider the unimaginable and thus mismanaged the risk. It seems the lessons of Fukushima are also being ignored in favor of wishing away risk, and hoping for inspired improvisation. There is thus good reason why citizens across Japan are filing lawsuits to block reactor restarts and some gutsy judges are resisting pressure from the nuclear village and siding with common sense.

Sending a Messages to Entergy's Corporate Headquarter ?

Basically this is Entergy territory.  New Orleans is the corporate home of Entergy and I imagine they have total control of Louisiana. We are in the heart of the wacko religious right wing Gov Jendal territory. Not doubt the petroleum industry and Entergy controls all the news outlets. What the hell, I was talking a shot at it. I bet you the newspapers notified them of the River Bend and Mike Mulligan issue. 

I was trying to remind Entergy they got more than Pilgrim problems. Playing River Bend against Pilgrim...the New England nukes off the Louisianan fleet? 

Check out the dates? I never got a response from either of these guys.

Did this play any role with Entergy announcing the possible shutdown of Pilgrim?       

New Orleans: "The Times-Picayune"

***From Mike Mulligan

To: mschleifstein@nola.com mschleifstein@nola.com 

Sep 11 at 8:41 PM 

Mark,

Here is a greater truth than the NRC's happyland truth.

I made a allegation/complaint about this trip...the special inspection was a result of my complaint. It took that to get the NRC off their lazy ass. I am one of a handful of outside people in the USA who ever initiated a special inspection at a nuclear plant, and the NRC admitted it. I am even a much rarer breed as this cascaded into two special inspections. I had help from River Bend insiders employees. The employees feel too intimidated to raise issues with the NRC or Entergy. There was a ton of broken or degraded equipment to show up in that trip. It occurred over and over again without correction.

River Bend and the Waterford nuclear plants are very troubled facilities.

I am a respected whistleblower and nuclear power plant safety advocate. I work closely with the NRC over many issues.

I write up everything on my blog: 

"NRC: Proof I Instigated The 2014 Christmas River Bend plant Scram Special Inspection"

http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2015/07/nrc-proof-i-instigated-2014-christmas.html 

Now you know the whole truth.

Sincerely,

Mike Mulligan

Hinsdale, NH

***From: Mike Mulligan

To mschleifstein@nola.com 

Sep 13 at 8:30 PM  

Mark, 

It speaks a lot when you asked for the simulator picture, they didn’t make back flips trying to schedule you for a trip into a simulator demonstration. Why are they so fixated on destructive secrecy? They should be proud to show the simulator it off. My guess is the simulator is obsolete and if they modeled the plant in detail it would slow down or freeze the scenario.

Remember the NRC dinged River Bend in 2005 about simulator fidelity issues. I talked the senior inspector about this 2005 violation within weeks after the Christmas trip. I told the inspector I thought there were simulator fidelity issues in the 2014 Christmas scam. The NRC inspectors were terrified and they knew employees were talking to me. I said the simulator was degraded in 2005, why didn’t the NRC completely clear this out in 2005? And keep it cleared out. Why doesn’t these big nuclear utilities tremble in absolute fear when the NRC says boo?  

The NTSB demands airplane cockpit videos and voice recording. It is a wonderful training opportunity. Increasingly the NTSB is requiring accident and full time video and voice recordings in all trains. Why isn’t it required in the control rooms of all nuclear power plants? The police departments throughout the nation are beginning to use small cameras and voice full time on all cops and in their police cars. Can you imagine if the NRC was forced by policy to release the video recording of the control room on their bungled Christmas scram? You would have been horrified by what you saw on and during the Christmas trip...you wouldn't have to be a expert to interpret it. It would have deeply transformed Entergy and the industry for the better. That is how powerful these guys are (transparency). Don’t go looking for that nuclear plant accident video recording…the industry agreed decades ago to never install video recorder in any US control room because it is such a powerful public tool

***From: Mike Mulligan

To mschleifstein@nola.com

Sep 13 at 8:45 PM  

You get what is going on here, we are overly dependent on the NRC’s and licensees interpretation of what went on in the control room or events in the plant. There is self-interest and protection going on here. An objective democratic video and voice recording of say the River Bend Christmas scram would allow the multitudes to make up their minds on the competence of the NRC and Entergy.    

This was written for you: 

 http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2015/09/truth.html

Baton Rouge: "The Advocate"

***From: Michael Mulligan

To: awold@theadvocate.com 

Sep 15 at 9:23 AM 

Amy,   

I made a allegation/complaint about this trip...the special inspection was a result of my complaint.  I am one of a handful of outside people in the USA who ever initiated a special inspection at a nuclear plant, and the NRC admitted it. I am even a much rarer breed as this cascaded into two special inspections. I had help from River Bend insiders employees. The employees feel too intimidated to raise issues with the NRC or Entergy. There was a ton of broken or degraded equipment to show up in that trip. It occurred over and over again without correction.

River Bend and the Waterford nuclear plants are very troubled facilities.

I am a respected whistleblower and nuclear power plant safety advocate. I work closely with the NRC over many issues.

I write up everything on my blog:

"NRC: Proof I Instigated The 2014 Christmas River Bend plant Scram Special Inspection"

http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2015/07/nrc-proof-i-instigated-2014-christmas.html

Now you know the whole truth.

Sincerely,

Mike Mulligan

Hinsdale, NH

1-603-209-420

***From Mike Mulligan

To awold@theadvocate.com 

Sep 15 at 9:52 PM  

http://allthingsnuclear.org/the-saturday-night-live-approach-to-nuclear-safety-more-cowbell/

The exact some problem I face when I first seen the River Bend Christmas scram. It stands way outside how much troubles Entergy is having with their nuclear Fleet. They are just not spending enough money on the fleet.

In the good old days the NRC used their rules and policies to control the bad actors in the industry. In the recent decades, all the new rules and policies are aimed at controlling and limiting the local NRC inspectors.

Entergy Talking Out Both Sides Of Their Mouth.

Everything is just a financial game with these guys: "(Denault) what’s the right value play"

CEO Denault about Possible shutdown of Fitzpatrick

"Entergy will need to consider “what’s the right value play as well as what’s the right allocation of resources. And does that free up cash that we could use elsewhere,” he said." 

Entergy's official Noyes on Possible shutdown of Pilgrim 

“If the corporation finds that the cost of making the improvements of the plant exceed the value of the plant, the corporation may decide to shut the plant down,” said David Noyes, the plant’s director of regulatory and performance improvement."

 

 

Pilgrim nuclear plant says it may shut down

The article is on the front page right side.

The NRC has been talking to these High Officials for years...I bet Entergy warned them we will just pull the plug if you identify all our problems. So the NRC in recent years was pulling their punches?

Remember Fitzpatrick is in the same boat with Entergy threatening to close them also.   

Pilgrim mulls whether to spend millions on safety upgrades

By David Abel Globe Staff  September 17, 2015 

Officials at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station are considering whether they can afford the multimillion-dollar safety improvements and other reforms required by federal officials. If not, they say, they might close the plant. 

After the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission downgraded the plant’s safety rating earlier this month, Pilgrim joined two reactors in Arkansas as the least safe in the country. Expensive repairs are needed to raise the safety rating of the 43-year-old plant, run by Entergy Corp. since 1999. 

“If the corporation finds that the cost of making the improvements of the plant exceed the value of the plant, the corporation may decide to shut the plant down,” said David Noyes, the plant’s director of regulatory and performance improvement. 

He added: “No business decision has been made about Pilgrim. We’re looking at specific conditions, and analyzing weaknesses associated with the plant. As of right now, we don’t know the costs.” 

The plant could also be shut down by the regulatory commission. A succession of unplanned shutdowns of its reactor in recent years, and inspections that revealed significant safety problems, resulted in its being moved to the next-to-lowest performance category two weeks ago. 

None of the nation’s 99 reactors are currently in the lowest category, but if Pilgrim fails to comply with federal requirements, the commission will move it there. Such action would require the plant to close, at least temporarily. 

The NRC is smoking dope with 142,857 years.

Part of the problem here is the risk calculations are set too low. If they came up with a chance of core damage say of once every 50 years, everyone would have been force to confront the Pilgrim issue much earlier. They would have never allowed them to get this bad. Just so you understand, core damage never takes out a plant (yet. We should have a computer model where events at the plant can estimate the political damage of a credibility meltdown leading to a plant shutdown. We are losing many plants to credibility meltdowns and none from core damage. Is the bad stories such as Fukushima, VY and Pilgrim cumulative...putting bad stories in the minds of the public?

So risk of shutdown constitutes the risk of core damage and a loss of credibility...the lost of credibility accident occurs much more frequently.

Again, will the Pilgrim saga force the hand of NY and entergy to prematurely pull the plug on Indian Point? It sure likes like when electric prices are heading up, the merchant model is the goose who laid a golden egg. When prices are going down, the merchants are the anchor chained to your leg that is going to drown you when you are the weakest?  

The commission said the plant’s level of risk is “low to moderate.” Entergy officials said that the odds of an event occurring that would damage its reactor core, before they made recent repairs, was one in every once every 142,857 years. 

Pilgrim, which provides an average of about 12.5 percent of the state’s electricity, is located 35 miles from Boston; about 5 million people live and work within a 50-mile radius of the plant. 

In a recent letter to Entergy officials, Governor Charlie Baker urged Entergy to “make certain that the plant meets the highest safety standards.” 

“We cannot risk the well-being of the residents of the commonwealth,” Baker wrote. 

Baker added that he was troubled that Entergy “has failed to take appropriate corrective actions to address the causes of several unplanned shutdowns dating back to 2013.”

Baker has said he sees Pilgrim as part of a “balanced approach” to the state’s energy needs, while other state lawmakers have long called for the plant to be closed. 

Entergy was awarded a 20-year operating license in 2012 to continue operating Pilgrim, but opponents are hoping to use the downgrade to pressure the company to shutter the plant now. 

On Wednesday, state Senator Dan Wolf, a Harwich Democrat, met with advocates from the Sierra Club, the Environmental League of Massachusetts, the Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group, and others. 

They discussed how to advance bills in the Legislature that require the company to pay fees to store its spent nuclear fuels at Pilgrim, and that would force Entergy to show that it has enough money to cover the costs of securing its spent fuel after the plant closes.

“These bills will get across to Entergy that they need to bake these costs into running the plant and think of its financial viability,” Wolf said. “They’re going to have to make financial decisions.” 

Entergy officials declined to provide information about the plant’s operating costs or revenue. Although the company’s stock price has plummeted this year by nearly 30 percent, nuclear regulatory officials have maintained that Entergy is solvent. 

In a letter sent this summer to an environmental group in New York, William Dean, director of nuclear reactor regulation at the commission, wrote that Entergy’s “current financial qualifications are adequate to continue safe operation at Pilgrim.” 

In response to questions from the Globe about the company’s finances, Lauren Burm, an Entergy spokeswoman, wrote: “Entergy does not disclose in our investor relations or Securities and Exchange Commission filings, individual plant profit, or operating cost information. It is considered proprietary business information.” 

Entergy officials have six months to present the Nuclear Regulatory Commission with a detailed improvement plan. Commission officials will then send teams of inspectors to the plant to review the causes of the unplanned shutdowns over the past three years and to determine whether equipment needs to be replaced and whether the plant’s management needs to improve safety. 

The commission bills Entergy for the inspections, which federal officials estimate will cost nearly $2 million. Entergy officials said they have already spent about $70 million to provide safety and security upgrades to the plant since the 2011 radiation leak at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear station, which has the same basic design as Pilgrim. 

“We have a number of actions already ongoing to address performance gaps identified,” Noyes said. “We have existing action plans and we plan to execute those.” 

State energy officials declined interview requests about how Massachusetts would make up for the lost power if Pilgrim closes. 

If a closure were to happen soon, it would come as the state has made drastic reductions to its reliance on coal. Last year, the Mt. Tom power plant in Holyoke became the last of the state’s three coal plants to schedule a permanent shutdown. The Salem Harbor Power Station closed last year, while Brayton Point in Somerset is scheduled to stop operating in 2017. 

The state now gets about 58 percent of its energy from natural gas, while oil supplies about 9 percent, coal about 3 percent, and renewable energy about 2 percent. The rest comes from hydroelectric power and other sources. 

The state would likely have to import more natural gas, which would have an impact on its carbon emissions. Nuclear power doesn’t emit carbon. 

“The administration continues to engage with the Legislature on Massachusetts’ energy needs and is committed to addressing the impact of power plant retirements on energy markets,” said Katie Gronendyke, a spokeswoman for the state Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs, in a statement.

Pilgrim: White Safety Relief Valve Problems

August 26, 2015
EN 15-024 

OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT ENFORCEMENT ACTION

Subject: ISSUANCE OF FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION

This is to inform the Commission that a Notice of Violation (NOV) associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding will be issued on or about September 1, 2015, to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (licensee) as a result of an inspection at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Pilgrim).

The White finding involved the licensee’s failure to establish measures to promptly identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality, or take corrective actions to preclude repetition, relating to a component that is essential to perform the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) safety-related functions. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify that the ADS ‘A’ safety/relief valve (SRV) did not open upon manual actuation on February 9, 2013. The licensee therefore did not take action to preclude repetition, which resulted in the failure of the ADS ‘C’ SRV to operate upon manual actuation on January 27, 2015. Also, because the licensee was not aware of the ‘A’ SRV’s inoperability from February 9, 2013, until January 27, 2015, a period greater than the allowed Technical Specification (TS) outage time, the required actions of the TS were not followed.

A NOV is included based on the licensee’s failure to establish measures to assure that
conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected, and failure to assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action”.

Oyster Creek: Yellow Safety Relief Valve Problems.

This is probably the model for end-of-life plants in the future. The plant is operating with obscenely obsolete equipment and in its closing years it is just not worth wasting money on a dying plant.

You catch here with these severe safety relief valve (electromatic relief valve) problems it seems to only occur in plants who are severely troubled and many other component have been implicated in degradations.  

What I never got, it was a initial design defect...why did it only show up at end of life?

OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT ENFORCEMENT ACTION Subject: ISSUANCE OF FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION

This is to inform the Commission that two separate Notices of Violation (NOV), one associated with a Yellow Significance Determination Process (SDP) finding and one associated with a White SDP finding, will be issued on or about April 27, 2015, to Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) as a result of separate inspections at its Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Station. The Yellow finding represents an issue of substantial safety significance. The White finding represents an issue of low to moderate safety significance. These findings will result in additional NRC inspection and potentially other NRC action.

The Yellow finding involved the failure by Exelon to establish adequate measures for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the electromatic relief valves (EMRVs). Specifically, since original installation of the EMRVs in 1969, until the valves were redesigned and reinstalled during the 2014 refueling outage, the EMRV actuators were inadequate because when they were placed in an environment where the actuator was subject to vibration associated with plant operation, the mechanical tolerance between posts and guides created a condition where the springs could wedge between the guides and the posts, jamming the actuator plunger assembly. In addition, given the original design of the valve, the maintenance refurbishing processes were not adequate to maintain the required internal tolerances to prevent excessive fretting and wear of the internal components. As a result, the staff determined that two EMRVs were inoperable for greater than the allowed Technical Specification outage time of 24 hours.

The White finding involved the failure by Exelon to review the suitability of a new emergency diesel generator (EDG) belt maintenance process that was essential to a safety-related function of the EDGs and to verify the acceptance criteria of that process. Specifically, from May 13, 2005, to September 9, 2014, Exelon changed the method for tensioning the cooling fan belt on the EDG from measuring belt deflection to measuring belt frequency and did not verify the adequacy of the acceptance criteria stated for the new method. As a result, the specified belt frequency imposed a stress above the fatigue endurance limit of the shaft material, making the EDG cooling fan shaft susceptible to fatigue and failure which occurred on July 28, 2014. As a result, the staff determined that EDG No. 2 was inoperable for greater than the allowed Technical Specification outage time of 7 days...

Dresden: More White Safety Relief Valve Problems?

This was a prolong event with uncontrollable quality in the safety relief valves (electromatic relief valve). I don't think the white finding is significant enough to create a organizational behavior change across Pilgrim, Dresden or Oyster Creek. 

September 16, 2015
EA-15-115

SUBJECT: FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION OF WHITE FINDING AND NOTICE OFVIOLATION; NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000237/2015010; DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION

This letter provides you the final significance determination of the preliminary White finding discussed in our previous communication dated July 1, 2015, which included U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspection Report No. 05000237/2015002; 05000249/2015002; 07200037/2015001. This report is available in the NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) at Accession Number ML15219A500. The finding involved the failure of the Unit 2 “C” electromatic relief valve (ERV) to perform its intended safety function. 

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires, in part, that measures be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems, and components. Technical Specification 3.4.3, Safety and Relief Valves, Limiting Condition for Operation requires, in part, that in Modes 1, 2, and 3, the relief function of five relief valves shall be OPERABLE. Required Action A states that if one relief valve is inoperable, then restore the valve to operable status within 14 days. Required Action B states, in part, that if the Required Action and associated Completion Time are not met, then (1) be in Mode 3 within 12 hours and (2) be in Mode 4 within 36 hours.

Technical Specification 3.5.1, ECCS Operating, Limiting Condition for Operation requires, in part, that in Modes 1, 2, and 3, with pressure above 150 pounds per square inch gauge (psig), the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) function of five relief valves shall be OPERABLE. Required Action H, states that, if one ADS valve is inoperable, then restore the valve to operable status within 14 days. Required Action I states, in part, that if the Required Action H and associated Completion Time are not met, then (1) be in Mode 3 within 12 hours, and (2) reduce reactor steam dome pressure to less than 150 psig within 36 hours.

Contrary to the above, from December 1, 2009, to February 7, 2015, the licensee failed to establish measures for the review of suitability of application for the ADS electromatic relief valve (ERV) actuators, which are essential to perform the safety-related reactor vessel depressurization and overpressure protection functions. This resulted in a failure of the 2C ERV, and an indeterminate period of inoperability and unavailability greater than allowed by Technical Specifications 3.4.3 and 3.5.1 during operating cycle D2C24. The 2C ERV inoperability during the operating cycle was identified after the failure of the valve during its first operational test in mid-cycle outage D2F56. Additionally, because the licensee was not aware of the valve’s inoperability between 2013 and 2015 during operating cycle D2C24, the required actions in Actions 3.4.3 A and B, and 3.5.1 H and were not followed.

What the Hell is Wrong with the McGuire Plant?

9/16/15 11 AM

05000369/370

I never get anything bad NRC reports about these guys.  They seem to be able to stay up at power. No scram problems. They are the kid in the class you never hear a peep out of? He got to be sick. A two unit site, we should be hearing about something all the time?

How the hell do these guys stay out trouble?

Sitting on a beautiful Lake Norman, a few miles from Charlotte and modern civilization and shopping malls. It must be sweet living. The only drawback is it is in the south.

Not a big deal yet...cool coincidence?

Update 9/18

Not a big deal yet...cool coincidence though?

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51406
Facility: MCGUIRE Region: 2 State: NC Unit: [1] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: RYAN WHISNANT HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO	Notification Date: 09/17/2015 Notification Time: 21:32 [ET] Event Date: 09/17/2015 Event Time: 16:10 [EDT] Last Update Date: 09/17/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY	Person (Organization): MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation
2	N	N	0	Refueling	0	Refueling

Event Text

MINIATURE ALCOHOL BOTTLE DISCOVERED INSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA "A miniature alcohol bottle, containing trace amounts of liquid, was discovered inside the protected area. Site security took possession of the bottle and removed it from the protected area." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Palo Verde: Electric Breaker Rapid Combustion : )

Can you trust the officials at Palo Verde nuclear Power plant Ever Again?

This was a electrical explosion plain and clear.

Prettifying equipment failures: I now don't trust these guys...

So it looked and sounded and they entered a explosion classification procedure....but its actually rapid combustion. Only in a nuclear plant. They are they too timid to put the truth down on paper. How widespread is prettifying documents at Palo Verde?

I think it demeans the  people who had to respond to this and the potential they all face in a power plant 

As a result, an Emergency Classification of HU2.2, EXPLOSION was declared due to the Load Center breaker failure and noise and visible indication observed in the field. 

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51403
Facility: PALO VERDE Region: 4 State: AZ Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE NRC Notified By: ROBERT PIERCE HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA	Notification Date: 09/17/2015 Notification Time: 02:53 [ET] Event Date: 09/16/2015 Event Time: 23:01 [MST] Last Update Date: 09/17/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED	Person (Organization): THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO) WILLIAM GOTT (IRD) MARC DAPAS (RA) SCOTT MORRIS (NRR) WILLIAM DEAN (NRR)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO RAPID COMBUSTION OF A LOAD CENTER BREAKER "The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event, or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. "Non Class Load Center Breaker, 2ENGN-L04 failed, resulting an a visible observation of rapid combustion and resultant charring (burned area) of the breaker enclosure and housing. No physical deformation to the breaker housing or surrounding area has been identified. The rapid combustion self-extinguished immediately following the audible and visible combustion event. As a result, an Emergency Classification of HU2.2, EXPLOSION was declared due to the Load Center breaker failure and noise and visible indication observed in the field. "The plant was, and continues to operate at 100% full power operations on normal power alignment. The 2ENGN-L04 Non-Class Load Center breaker supplies power to non-essential service loads and has no immediate impact to plant operation or safety mitigating systems. The plant remains stable and the event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

A Poor Maintenance Fiasco at Fermi

Losing an air compressor is a nasty accident because there is many air operated valves. 

Three important pumps lost and discovered two valve that are broken? I junk plant.

***It looks like the plant simulator didn't model single LOOP operation...

These guys should have made the decision to conservatively shutdown before doing this runaway maintenance monster. It is a outright mania trying to keep these plants up a power no matter how degraded the plant is.

***A pattern of panic scrams and losing control of the cooling systems. Again, you catch how two poor maintenance problem led to the scram. 

On March 19, 2015 the unit automatically scrammed due to actuation of the Reactor Protection System function of OPRM Upscale. The unit had just transitioned to single loop operation after operators secured a reactor recirculation pump due to the loss of its normal and emergency cooling water supply.

***The LER: On March 19, 2015, at 0647 hours, the Fermi 2 annunciators indicated a cooling water leak in the drywell. The Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) system [[CC]] was isolated and both divisions of the Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system were started. Approximately four minutes later signs of Division 1 EECW pump cavitation were observed indicating that the leak affected the north (A) reactor recirculation pump [[AD]] cooling. The north (A) reactor recirculation pump was tripped at 0652 to prevent motor damage from loss of cooling and the reactor transitioned. 

Sounds like they had a water hammer... 

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION

September 15, 2015

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE - PNO-III-15-009

This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. Some of the information may not yet be fully verified or evaluated and is basically all that is known by the Region III staff on this date.

 Fermi Power Plant (Fermi 2)
DTE Energy Company
Newport, MI

SUBJECT: UNPLANNED SHUTDOWN GREATER THAN 72 HOURS FOLLOWING THE LOSS OF COOLING WATER IN THE TURBINE BUILDING

 At 11:05 p.m. (EDT) on September 13, 2015, operators manually shut down (scrammed) Fermi 2 from 100 percent power after attempts to correct a malfunction of a nonsafety-related cooling water system in the turbine building were unsuccessful and the three pumps in the system shut down. The malfunction arose earlier that evening while operators were working on the cooling water system heat exchangers. 

All control rods inserted and all plant systems responded normally to the scram. The loss of the nonsafety-related cooling water system resulted in the loss of the station compressed air system, which affected valves that are operated by air. Operators took the appropriate actions for those affected valves.

The licensee is investigating the cause of the malfunction and will be repairing two valves that were identified as in need of repair. On September 14, the licensee successfully restarted the nonsafety-related cooling water system. The licensee stated that the reactor would be shutdown for at least 72 hours.

The NRC resident inspector was notified of the scram, promptly responded to the plant, and monitored activities throughout the early morning. The NRC is currently monitoring the troubleshooting, repair, and restart activities.